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The physical singularity of life phenomena is analyzed by means of comparison with the
driving concepts of theories of the inert. We outline conceptual analogies, transferals of
methodologies and theoretical instruments between physics and biology, in addition to indi-
cating signiﬁcant differences and sometimes logical dualities. In order to make biological
phenomenalities intelligible, we introduce theoretical extensions to certain physical theo-
ries. In this synthetic paper, we summarize and propose a uniﬁed conceptual framework
for the main conclusions drawn from work spanning a book and several articles, quoted
throughout1.
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1. A DEFINITION OF LIFE?
Throughout the very old“physicalism/vitalism”debate, it has often
been question of deﬁning what is the phenomenon of life. A small
but remarkable book by Schrödinger (“What is life?”) contributed
to reviving the debate in a way we ﬁnd to be relevant, at least in its
second part, and to which we refer in section 2. For the moment,
let’s precise how we approach this question:
Primo An “ideal” deﬁnition of life phenomena seems out of
the question: there is no Platonic idea of life to be grasped in a
deﬁnite manner or with the maximal conceptual stability and
invariance speciﬁc to mathematical notions (as there is with
the deﬁnition or idea of the triangle. . .). It is rather a question
of deﬁning a few operational notions enabling to draw out con-
cepts with which to work for a systemic approach in biology.
Moreover, physics does not deﬁne “matter” otherwise than by
means of an operative duality or contraposition (with respect
to the concept of energy or to that of vacuum or of anti-matter,
for example). Yet another, very rigorous, “provable impossibil-
ity to deﬁne the object of study” is presented in an appendix.
Notice that Darwin’s approach to evolution does neither use
nor need a deﬁnition of life, but needs organisms.
Segundo Any operational attempt, in our opinion, must be
made with respect to the speciﬁc phenomenality of life phe-
nomena: for example, it is possible that for any chosen ﬁnite
list of “deﬁning” properties of life, there would exist a suf-
ﬁciently talented computer scientist able to create its virtual
image to be rendered on a computer screen (it is quite simple
to program an “autopoietic” system (Varela et al., 1974; Varela,
1An activity enhanced by collaborations with Francis Bailly, deceased in 2009.
1989) or a formalized metabolic cycle in the manner of Rosen
(1991) – see Mossio et al., 2009, for example). However, not
only any human being, but also the most simple-minded of
animals would recognize it as a series of non-living “virtual
images” (which are typically detectable through identical iter-
ation, as indirectly suggested by Turing’s imitation game, see
Longo, 2008).
It is rather a question of proposing a possibly robust intelligi-
bility of a phenomenality in its constitutive history, while keeping
in mind the fact that any constitution is contingent – both the con-
stitution (evolution) of life and of our historical understanding of
it. That is, life and our modest attempts to grasp it unfold over
a material evolution (better still: over one of the possible evolu-
tions, taking place on this Earth, in these ecosystems and with this
physical matter and history). As for life, our point of view includes
what biologists often express when they say that nothing can be
understood in biology otherwise than in the light of evolution
(Darwinian and in this world).
It should be clear that we do not discuss here how “life may be
emerged from the inert,” but rather we explore how to go from
the current theories of inert to a sufﬁciently robust theory of the
living. In particular, we hint here to an analysis of the physical
singularity and of the speciﬁcity of the living object, by looking
ﬁrst at the properties we would want to have (or not ) in any the-
ory of the “living state of matter.” It is indeed an incomplete (see
appendix) attempt at providing a conceptual framework guiding
more speciﬁc analyses. We thus present herein a brief synthesis, in
an explicit play between physics and biology,which can only direct
the interested reader toward the works presented in the references.
In a methodological appendix, we will borrow from Mathematical
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Logic an understanding of the role of incompleteness in“our theo-
retical endeavors toward knowledge” (to put it in H. Weyl’s words)
and of its relation to conceptual or formal “deﬁnitions,” of life in
particular.
2. FROM PHYSICS TO BIOLOGY BY THEORETICAL
EXTENSIONS AND CONCEPTUAL DUALITIES
Various physical theories (classical, relativistic, quantum, ther-
modynamic) make the inert intelligible in a remarkable way.
Signiﬁcant incompatibilities exist (the relativistic and quantum
ﬁelds are not uniﬁed; they are in fact incompatible). However,
some major principles (of conceptual construction, see Bailly and
Longo, 2011) confer a great unity to contemporary theoretical
physics. The geodesic principle and its accompaniment by “sym-
metries” (Weyl, 1952; Van Fraassen, 1989; Bailly and Longo, 2011)
enable to grasp, under a conceptually unitary perspective, a wide
area of knowledge regarding the inert. Biology, having to date
been less “theorized” and mathematized, can also progress in the
construction of its theoretical frameworks by means of analo-
gies, extensions, and differentiations regarding physical theories,
even by means of conceptual dualities. Regarding dualities, we will
mention below one which is, we believe, fundamental (and exten-
sively addressed in other works, Frezza and Longo, 2010; Bailly and
Longo, 2011; Longo and Montévil, 2011a): the genericity of physi-
cal objects (their theoretical and experimental invariance) and the
speciﬁcity of their trajectories (their reconstruction by means of
the geodesic principle) is inverted in the speciﬁcity (individuation
and history) of the living object and the genericity of trajecto-
ries (evolutionary, ontogenetic: they are just “possibilities” within
spaces – ecosystems – in co-constitution).
2.1. PHYSICAL ASPECTS
2.1.1. The exclusively physical
We exclude from our analyses those properties which come from
physics (where they are often essential), but of which the transferal
to biology is, from our point of view, misleading:
1. The genericity of objects (the theoretical and experimental
invariance of physical objects – or symmetry by replacement)
does not apply to biology: the living object is historical and
individuated; it is not “interchangeable,” in general or with the
generality of physics, not theoretically nor empirically.
2. The speciﬁcity of trajectories (geodesics, in physics), because
we exclude the prevalence of the geodesic principle (there
is no “optimality”) for ontogenetic and evolutive dynam-
ics of “biological individualities” – cells, organisms, species
(which we call, synthetically, “biolons”); in short, embryoge-
nesis, development, and evolution are not optimal trajectories,
but possible ones.
3. The stability of the reference system as such. Besides classical
physics, also in general relativity and in the energy/geometry
relationships in spacetime, the dimensions are set and do not
vary during the phenomenal analysis. Instead, the space of
observables in biology, of phenotypes for example, which can
also be described by new “dimensions,” is, itself, dynamically
changing in an ecosystem. Using an informal analogy, we could
say that the “phase space” (and the space of possibilities) of
life phenomena is dynamically (co-)constituted (Longo et al.,
2012). By a very informal analogy, observe that in relativity
theory, spacetime is (co-)constituted by the energy/matter dis-
tribution, yet in stable dimensions and phase space – while in
Longo et al. (2012) we claim that these change along biological
processes, evolution in particular.
As discussed in Longo and Montévil (2011a), the genericity of
physical objects and the speciﬁcity of their trajectory depend on
the theoretical symmetries which allows to constitute them. In
biology, our hypothesis is that the properly biological theoretical
symmetries are unstable. This leads to a change of the theoretical
status of biological objects with respect to physical situations. We
will discuss this point further bellow.
2.1.2. Physical properties of the “transition” toward the living state
In the literature, we often ﬁnd remarkable works concerning cer-
tain physical properties, sometimes transferred to the analyses of
life phenomena, but which we will later consider in their exclu-
sively biological form (i.e., that we only ﬁnd in the living state; for
example, critical transitions, which are pointwise in physics, will
be “extended” in our approach, see below). In biology, we there-
fore do not consider them “as such,” as they present themselves as
components of the analysis of the inert, where they nevertheless
provide a good starting point for reﬂections regarding life phe-
nomena (see the references). For the moment, let’s evoke them
from a physical perspective (“as such”) and stress that they partly
pertain the biological theoretical vocabulary, but do not properly
belong to it, in our view:
1. Criticality as such (in physics, present in phase transitions, as
a mathematical point with respect to the control parameter)
(Jensen, 1998; Zinn-Justin, 2007);
2. Organizational closure as such (present in physical chemistry:
micelles, vesicles – whose structure is entirely organized along
geodetic principles, in contrast to living organisms, see below);
3. Passive plasticity as such (present in changes of physical
form or in phenomena of action/reaction/propagation in the
manner of Turing, for example);
4. Scaling properties as such (present in numerous physical
phenomena and namely in critical transitions, anomalous
diffusion, etc.);
5. Growth phenomena as such (present in the growth of crystals,
for example);
6. Chirality as such (present in the physics of particles or
chemistry, for example);
7. Possibly negative variations of entropy (present in the passing
from disorder to order, in critical transition for example),
8. The dimensionality of physical quantities (almost always
present);
9. The measurement which is understood as an imprecision and
as a result classical (except when fractal);
10. The fractality as such of certain objects and dynamics (present
in a number of physical phenomena, but also in organs of
plants and animals as forced by their role in the exchange of
energy and matter) (Weibel, 1991);
11. The chemistry of macromolecules and of in vitro physical
chemistry.
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2.2. BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS
The contingent materiality of life phenomena includes, typically,
the physical chemistry speciﬁc to biology, our ﬁrst group of
properties:
2.2.1. A few “physical” properties of life phenomena
1. The biological role of the chirality of molecules (amino acids,
sugars) in the metabolism;
2. Various other physical invariances according to the level of
organization (the chemical bases and geometric structure of
DNA, relatively common to all living objects; the metabolic
invariants, including the metabolism/mass/duration relation-
ship, see below).
In addition to the above physical properties, which speciﬁcally
(and only) manifest themselves in life phenomena, the following
are certainly part of biological theorization:
1. Analysis in terms of physico-chemical substrates such as of
molecular cascades that may be found only in cells;
2. The mathematical extension of certain physical laws including
quantities that do not appear as such or in an operative way in
physics (for example, our notion of anti-entropy in metabolic
balances, mentioned below, which extend well-known balance
equations in thermodynamics by a new observable).
2.2.2. The maintenance of biological organization
The setting of physiological activities (the functions of “orgons” –
organelles, organs, populations, see Bailly et al., 1993; Bailly and
Longo, 2011), is often accompanied by organizational closure
which is accomplished by means of:
1. Themetabolism and physiological activities (essential to integra-
tion and to regulation) which interact and, in fact, superimpose
one another;
2. The coupling between various levels of organization, corre-
lated in a causal manner, both “upward” and “downward,”
particularly by integration and regulation,
3. The fractality of orgons in their physiological functions (lung,
vascular system, nervous system. . .intracellular structures);
4. The scaling laws (allometry describes temporality and metab-
olism in function of the adult biological mass) (Brown et al.,
2002; West, 2006);
5. The importance of pure numbers (without physical dimen-
sions) and of their relative invariance ( total number of heart-
beats, respirations. . .which are on average constant for mam-
mals, and even among important groups of less studied species
as for internal rhythms).
We will attempt to conceptually frame these properties of the liv-
ing state of matter by means of relatively new concepts, including
that of extended critical transition in 1, as locus and framework for
these phenomena which we merely enumerated above.
2.2.3. The relationship to the environment
To these functions, we must add the relationship to the environ-
ment that is not only dynamic, but adaptive and (or because)
cognitive (as are protentional activities). Moreover, the dynamic is
also situated at the level of the reference space (relevant para-
meters and observables), as an organism co-modiﬁes its own
environment:
1. Adaptive plasticity at all levels of organization, in the interaction
with an environment;
2. The cognitive, present as soon as there is life, resides, in
particular, in the capacity to discriminate (the denumerable
density of critical points within the zone of extended criticality
mentioned below can represent this discriminatory capacity, by
discontinuous passages (but without gaps) from one point to
another);
3. The principle of compatibility (tendency to achieve all possibil-
ities compatible with the given constraints), which justiﬁes the
genericity of evolutive and ontogenetic trajectories;
4. The speciﬁcity of the object and, as we were saying in 3, the
genericity of trajectories (contrarily to physics);
5. The changes in reference spaces, which induces and enables,
including in the number of relevant description dimensions
(the“phase space”itself – relevant parameters andobservables –
changes over the course of the dynamics of life phenomena, as
opposed to the physical frameworks, even quantum ones).
Again,most of this aspects are related to an instability of biological
theoretical symmetries, associated here to the constitution by the
biological object of the theoretically relevant environment.
2.2.4. Passage to analyses of the organism
Critical transitions are extensively discussed in the analysis of the
passage, in particular, from the inert to the living (Kauffman,
1993). As such, they very well describe states of the inert that
are quite interesting also for biology (see Binney et al., 1992; Mora
and Bialek, 2011). In physics, though,“coherent structures”appear
over pointwise transitions, and normally in a reversible way. We
are, however, facing a living state of matter when criticality is
irreversible and endures (till death). We deal with these issues by
considering an organism as staying in a“continual”(ongoing) irre-
versible transition. Eachmitosis, in amulticellular organism,yields
an asymmetric bifurcation and the formation of a new coherence
structure – new tissular matrix . . ., as components of a critical
transition. In our approach, the interval of criticality is therefore
extended in time and in all relevant control parameters (tem-
perature, pressure. . .), see section 1. The key idea is that all the
usual properties of critical phase transitions are preserved (the
formation of coherence structures, diverging correlation lengths,
symmetry changes . . .). Yet, while, in physics, these only apply
in a topologically isolated point (at least this is the mathemati-
cal representation, where the renormalization methods apply, see
section 1), we consider the “transition” to be deﬁned on a non-
trivial interval. This occurs when rhythms (point 1 below and
section 3), protentional activity (point 2 and 3), and organization,
as anti-entropy (point 3 and 4, see also 2) jointly appear.
We may then conceive (but this discussion is not our aim, here)
that, at the origin of the extended criticality of life, there may have
been particular critical transitions of the inert matter, a global
transition suddenly superposing all the ones we are dealing with.
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These may all be described as conceptual and material “bifurca-
tions,” with their organizational correlates: extension of criticality
to an interval, by the formation of stabilizing membranes and of
different levels of organization (as anti-entropy),bifurcation of the
time dimension (autonomous rhythms). Yet, extended criticality
is an ongoing phenomena for life, well beyond its origin. The ﬁve
points below will be at the core of the synthesis in this text (and are
described in detail in the articles included in the references). We
therefore propose to organize these“bifurcations,”which mark the
(conceptual) passage from a state of the inert to the living state, as
a constitution of:
1. The second temporal dimension, the compactiﬁed time of
biological rhythms;
2. The protention, as a “proactive gesture” in the interaction with
the ecosystem, present with even the simplest forms of life;
3. Anti-entropy, as the establishment and maintenance of organi-
zation (which is opposed to disorganization – in particular to
the entropy produced by all irreversible processes);
4. The distinction in several levels of organization, at the core of
the integration and regulation activity of any living unit (which
may be conceptually uniﬁed as orgons – organelles, organs,
populations – and biolons – cells, organisms, species).
5. An instability of the theoretical symmetries of the objects, which
can be seen as a cascade of symmetry changes, in time, and
leads to variability in the strong sense of changing theoretical
symmetries.
In short, the intelligibility of life phenomena that we propose pre-
supposes the existence (“somewhere,” “at the origin of life”) of
correlated bifurcations whose understanding requires the addition
of the new theoretical entities above. These are perfectly compat-
ible with physical theorization, but they are not speciﬁc to it. In
this sense, it is a matter of proposing compatible, but “strict” the-
oretical extensions of theories of the inert. Reduction may be a
further step for the interested reductionist, who should prove that
these theories are ﬁrst conservative (in the sense of Logic), then
only apparently “strict.”
3. THE PHYSICAL SINGULARITY OF THE LIVING STATE OF
MATTER
Let’s now return,with a few more details, to these new objectivities
relevant for the biological. In no way, by the concepts we hint to,
we intend to deﬁne or characterize life. We just try to focus on
some phenomenalities which seem particularly preeminent and
try to treat them in a possibly conceptually robust fashion. The
three points below brieﬂy outline the work developed over several
articles, to which we refer when appropriate.
3.1. EXTENDED CRITICALITY
The biological interest of physical theories of criticality is due ﬁrst
to the fact that, in physics, critical phase transitions are processes of
change of state where, by the sudden change (a singularity w. r. to a
control parameter), the global structure is involved in the behavior
of its elements: the local situation depends upon (is correlated to)
the global situation. Mathematically, this may be expressed by the
fact that the correlation length formally tends toward inﬁnity (the
case with second order transitions, such as para-/ferromagnetic
transition); physically, this means that the determination is global
and not local. In other words, a critical transition is related to
a change of phase and to the appearing of critical behaviors of
some magnitudes of the system’s states – magnetization, density,
for example – or of some of its particular characteristics – such
as correlation length. It is likely to appear at equilibrium (null
ﬂuxes) or far from equilibrium (non-null ﬂuxes). In the ﬁrst
case, the physico-mathematical aspects are rather well-understood
(renormalization as for themathematics (Binney et al., 1992), ther-
modynamics for the bridge between microscopic and macroscopic
description), while, in the second case, we are far from having
theories as satisfactory.
Some speciﬁc cases, without particular emphasis on the far
from equilibrium situation, have been extensively developed and
publicized by Bak, Kauffman, and others (see Bak et al., 1988;
Kauffman, 1993; Nykter et al., 2008). The sand hips, whose criti-
cality reduces to the angle of formation of avalanches in all scales,
percolation (see Bak et al., 1988; Laguës and Lesne, 2003) or even
the formation of a snowﬂake are interesting examples. The per-
spective assumed is, in part, complementary to Prigogine’s: it is not
ﬂuctuations within a weakly ordered situation that matter in the
formation of coherence structures, but the “order that stems from
chaos” (Kauffman, 1993). Yet, in both cases potential correlations
are suddenly made possible by a change in one or more control
parameters for a speciﬁc (pointwise) value of this parameter. For
example, the forces attracting water molecules toward each other,
as ice, are potentially there: the passage below a precise tempera-
ture, as decreasing Brownian motion, at a certain value of pressure
and humidity, allows these forces to apply and, thus, the formation
of a snow ﬂakes, typically.
The critical transitions must be also understood as sudden
symmetry changes (symmetry breakings and formation of new
symmetries), and a transition between two different macroscopic
physical objects (two different states), with a conservation of the
symmetries of the components. The speciﬁc, local and global sym-
metry breakings give the variety of organized forms and their
regularities (the new symmetries) as these transitions are (very)
sensitive to ﬂuctuations in the vicinity of criticality. In physics, the
pointwise nature of the “critical value” of the control parameter
is an essential mathematical issue, as for the treatment by the rel-
evant mathematics of “renormalization” in theories of criticality
(see Binney et al., 1992).
Along the lines of the physical approaches to criticality, but
within the frame of far from equilibrium thermodynamics, we
consider living systems as “coherent structures” in a continual
(extended) critical transition. The permanent state of transi-
tion is maintained, at each level of organization, by the inte-
gration/regulation activities of the organism, that is by its global
coherent structure.
In short, in recent work (Bailly and Longo, 2008; Longo
and Montévil, 2011a), on the grounds of early ideas in Bailly
(1991), we propose to analyze the organization of living matter
as “extended critical transitions.” These transitions are extended
in spacetime and with respect to all pertinent control parameters
(pressure, temperature, etc.), their unity being ensured through
global causal relations between levels of organization (and their
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integration/regulation). More precisely, our main theoretical par-
adigm is provided by the analysis of critical phase transitions,
as this peculiar form of critical state presents some particu-
larly interesting aspects for the biological frame: the formation
of extended (mathematically diverging) correlation lengths and
coherence structures, the divergence of some observables with
respect to the control parameter(s) and the change of symmetries
associated to potentially swift organizational changes. However,
the “coherent critical structures” which are the main focus of our
work cannot be reduced to existing physical approaches, since
phase transitions, in physics, are treated as“singular events,” corre-
sponding to a speciﬁc well-deﬁned value of the control parameter,
just one (critical!) point as we said. Whereas our claim is that in
the case of living systems, these coherent critical transitions are
“extended” and maintained in such a way that they persist in the
many dimensional space of analysis, while preserving all the phys-
ical properties mentioned above (diverging correlation lengths,
new coherence structures, symmetry changes . . .). A living object
is not only a dynamics or a process, in the various possible senses
analyzed by physical theories, but it is permanent critical transi-
tion: it is always on the border of a change, of symmetries changes
in particular, as analyzed in Longo and Montévil (2011a). One
then has an extended, permanently reconstructed and transform-
ing global organization in an interaction with local structures,
as the global/local interplay is proper to critical transitions (by
singularities).
So far, our analysis, in the papers quoted above, has been largely
conceptual, since, by the loss of the mathematics of renormal-
ization, there seem to be little known Mathematical Physics that
applies to this physically singular, far from equilibrium situation.
The second major conceptual and technical difﬁculty is also clearly
the instability of the symmetries involved. The question is then
how to objectivize them, since, in contradiction with the physical
situations they do not seem to be theoretically determined to be
in a speciﬁc, pre-given set.
3.2. ANTI-ENTROPY
In (Bailly and Longo, 2009) our systemic perspective for biological
complexity, both in phylogenesis and ontogenesis, is developed by
an analysis of organization in terms of “anti-entropy,” a notion
we deﬁned and which conceptually differs from the common use
of “negative entropy.” Note that both the formation and mainte-
nance of organization (a permanent reconstruction of the coher-
ent structure) go in the opposite direction of entropy increase. This
is also Schrödinger’s concern in the second part of his 1944 book.
He considers the possible decrease of entropy by the construction
of “order from order,” that he informally calls negative entropy.
In our approach, anti-entropy is mathematically presented as a
new observable, it is therefore not just entropy with a negative
sign (negative entropy, as more rigorously presented in Shannon’s
Work and in Brillouin, 1956). Typically, when summed up, equal
entropy and negative entropy give 0: in our approach, entropy and
anti-entropy are found simultaneously only in the non-discrete
critical interval of the living state of matter. A purely concep-
tual analogy may be done with anti-matter in Quantum Physics:
this is a new observable, relative to new particles, whose proper-
ties (charge, energy) have opposite sign. Along our wild analogy,
matter and anti-matter never give 0, but a new energy state: the
double energy production as gamma rays, when they encounter in
a (pointwise!) singularity. Again, entropy and anti-entropy coexist
in an organism, as extended zone (interval) of criticality.
To this purpose, we introduced two principles (“existence and
maintenance of anti-entropy”), in addition to the thermodynamic
ones, which are (mathematically) compatible with traditional
principles but which have no meaning with regard to inert mat-
ter. The idea is that anti-entropy represents the key property of an
organism, even a unicellular one, to be describable by several levels
of organization (also an eukaryotic cell possesses organelles, say),
regulating, integrating each other – they are parts that functionally
integrate a whole, and the whole regulates them. This corresponds
to the formation and maintenance of a global coherence struc-
ture, in correspondence to its extended criticality: organization
increases, along embryogenesis say, and is maintained, by con-
trasting the ongoing entropy production due to all irreversible
processes. No extended criticality nor its key property of coher-
ence would be possible without anti-entropy production: (always
renewed) organization (expresses and) allows the maintenance of
the extended critical transition.
In Bailly and Longo (2009), we applied the notion of anti-
entropy to an analysis of Gould’s work on the complexiﬁcation
of life along evolution (Gould, 1997). We thus extended a tradi-
tional balance equation for the metabolism to the new notion
as speciﬁed by the principles above. This equation is inspired
by Gibbs’ analysis of free energy, which is hinted as a possible
tool for the analysis of biological organization in a footnote in
Schrödinger (1944). We examined far from equilibrium systems
and we focused in particular on the production of global entropy
associated to the irreversible character of the processes. In the 2009
paper, a close analysis of anti-entropy has been performed from
the perspective of a diffusion equation of biomass over pheno-
typic complexity along evolution. That is, we could reconstruct,
on the grounds of general principles, Gould’s complexity curve of
biomass over complexity in evolution (Gould, 1997). Moreover, a
quantitative evaluation of phenotypic complexity in embryogene-
sis is proposed, in relation to some empirical data (Caenorhabditis
elegans). Once more, Quantum Mechanics indirectly inspired our
mathematical approach: we borrowed Schrödinger’s operatorial
approach in his famous equation but in a classical framework.
Classically, that equation may be understood as a diffusion equa-
tion (as a matter of fact, we used real coefﬁcients instead of
complex ones, thus outside of the mathematical framework of
quantum theories).
3.3. BIOLOGICAL TIME
The usual physical (linear) representation of time is insufﬁcient,
in our view, for the understanding of some phenomena of life.
An extended form of present seems more adequate for the under-
standing of memory, since this is an essential component of learn-
ing, for the purposes of future action (based on “protention,” as
pre-conscious expectation). In particular, while memory, as reten-
tion, is treated in some physical theories (relaxation phenomena),
protention seems outside the scope of Physics. We then suggested
some simple functional representation of biological retention and
protention (Longo and Montévil, 2011b; see also Varela, 1999).
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Similarly, the role of biological rhythms do not seem to
have any counterpart in mathematical formalization of physical
clocks, which are based on frequencies along the usual (pos-
sibly thermodynamically) time. In Bailly et al. (2011) a two-
dimensional manifold as a “mathematical frame” for accommo-
dating autonomous biological rhythms is presented: the second
dimension is “compactiﬁed,” that is, it is a circular ﬁber orthogo-
nal to the oriented representation of physical time. The addition
of a new (compactiﬁed) dimension for biological time is jus-
tiﬁed by the peculiar dimensional status of internal biological
rhythms. Life is temporally scanned by both external (physical)
rhythms (Circadian, typically), which are frequencies, and inter-
nal ones (metabolism, respiration, cardiac rhythms). These are
pure numbers, not frequencies: they become average frequencies
and produce the time of life span, when used as coefﬁcient in scal-
ing laws (Schmidt-Nielsen, 1984; West et al., 1997; Savage et al.,
2004). These rhythms have also singular behaviors (multi-scale
variations) with respect to the physical time, which can be visual-
ized in our framework. In contradiction with physical situations,
the scaling, however, does not seem to be associated to a stable
exponent. These two peculiar features (pure numbers and fractal-
like time series) are the main evidences of the autonomy of our
compactiﬁed time with respect to the physical time.
The two new aspects of biological time allowed us to intro-
duce the abstract notion of “biological inertia,” as a component of
the conceptual time analysis of extended criticality. Note that our
approach of protention and retention is, for now, focused on local
aspects of biological time, and should therefore be completed to
accommodate the long range correlations observed experimentally
(see Grigolini et al., 2009). Indeed, this kind correlations is rele-
vant for both aspects of biological time, and ﬁts in the conceptual
framework of extended criticality.
Another aspect of biological time, introduced in Longo and
Montévil (2011a), is the time constituted by the cascade of sym-
metry changes which takes place in extended critical transitions.
In other terms, this time is deﬁned by the ubiquitous organiza-
tional transformations occurring in biological matter. Here, time
corresponds therefore to the historicity of biological objects and to
the process of biological individuation (both ontogenetic and phy-
logenetic). Indeed, time is no longer the parameter of trajectories
in the phase space since the latter is unstable, therefore the tempo-
rality deﬁned by the changes of phase space has an original nature.
4. CONCLUSION
Broadly speaking, except for the consideration in terms of
extended criticality and symmetry changes, the laws which we
propose, while addressing these particular observables and quan-
tities, speciﬁc to life phenomena, constitute a simple extension of
existing physical laws: they preserve the same formal mathemati-
cal structure and, if we set the value of the considered observables
or parameters to 0 (protention second temporal dimension, value
of anti-entropy), they return theories of inert. Our theoretical
propositions are thus compatible, although irreducible, to “exist-
ing physical theories.”That is, they are reducible to these laws only
if, but as soon as we are outside of the extended critical zone hav-
ing its own temporality and its anti-entropy, or as soon as these
speciﬁc quantities go to 0.
In conclusion, the peculiar phenomenality of life deserves some
new observables (extended critical transition, biological organiza-
tion, proper time, in our attempts). The point is the pertinence, if
any, of these treatments, “per se.” Those who claim that all these
concepts should be reduced to physical (existing?) theories are
welcome to try. But they should ﬁrst look at the history of Physics
itself, where novel theoretical frames are marked by the inven-
tion of new concepts and new perspectives. Their pertinence had
to be judged “as such,” not on the grounds of their reducibility
to existing, thus “safe,” explanatory grounds2. Note, however, that
extended critical transitions, in association with ubiquitous sym-
metry changes,may, however, lead to more radical methodological
changes, as associated to the speciﬁcity of objects and genericity
of trajectories.
2In other terms, should reduction or uniﬁcation be performed, the ﬁrst question is:
what does one want to reduce?
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APPENDIX
INTERFACES OF INCOMPLETENESS
Do we need to have a deﬁnition of life, in order to construct robust
theories of the living state of matter?
Let’s now answer to this question by an analogy with a frame
where it may be dealt with the highest rigor: Mathematical Logic.
Is the concept of integer (thus “standard” or ﬁnite) number
captured (deﬁned, characterized) by the (formal) theory of num-
bers? Frege (1984) believed so, as the absolute concept of number
was, in his view, fully characterized by Peano-Dedekind theory. In
modern logical terms, we can say that, for Frege, Peano Arithmetic
(PA) was “categorical.” That is, PA was believed to have just one
model, up to isomorphisms: the standard model of integers (the
one which the reader learned about in elementary school, with 0,
though, and formal induction). Thus, the theory was also meant
to uniquely deﬁne of “what a number is.”
This turned out to be blatantly wrong. Löwenheim and Skolem
(1915–1920) proved that PA has inﬁnitely many non-isomorphic
models.Moreover, a simple theorem (“compactness”) showed that
no predicate, deﬁnable in PA, may isolate all and exactly all the
standard integers (see Marker, 2002). In short, any predicate valid
on inﬁnitely many standard integers, must hold also for (inﬁn-
itely many) non-standard integers (which cannot be considered
properly “ﬁnite”) – this is known as the “overspill lemma.”Gödel’s
incompleteness theoremreinforced these negative properties: PA is
incomplete or, equivalently, it has lots of logically non-equivalent
models, a much stronger property than non-categoricity. A for-
tiori, there is no hope to characterize in a ﬁnitistic way the
concept of standard integer number. One has to add an axiom
of inﬁnity (Set Theory) or proper second order quantiﬁcation in
order to do so, and these are inﬁnitary or impredicative formal
frames.
Yet, everybody considers PA as the“natural” theory of numbers:
it beautifully singles out the main relevant, and very robust, prop-
erties of numbers (0, successor, induction), even though it cannot
deﬁne what a number is. In analogy to the impossibility of physics
to deﬁne its own object of study, physical matter, as we mentioned
at the beginning, we have here another example of sound theo-
retical frame, which cannot deﬁne, within itself, its own object of
study, the natural number object. We do not see a way to get out
from the language of physics or of biology as Mathematical Logic
can do: what would ever correspond to an axiom of inﬁnity or to
higher order quantiﬁcation? Perhaps: . . .“take the point of view
(and the language) of God”?
We encourage thus the reader to pursue his/her theoreticalwork
in biology without the anguishing search for a deﬁnition of life.
And with the clear perspective of the intrinsic incompleteness of
all our theoretical endeavors (Longo, 2011): we can just hope to
explicitly grasp and organize by theories some fragments of reality,
whatever this word may mean. Let’s try to do it toward the best
of our knowledge, in a sufﬁciently broad and robust way, and in
full theoretical and empirical freedom, without necessarily feel-
ing stuck either to existing theories nor always searching for the
“ultimate (complete?) Theory” nor the “ultimate reduction.”
Longo’s downloadable papers in http://www.di.ens.fr/users/
longo/
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